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The institutional nature of work has changed dramatically in over the last 300 years and there 
is no reason to assume that change will cease in the twenty-first century. This article criticizes 
the theoretical basis for some previous confident predictions, including de-skilling (Marx), 
and massive reductions in the extent of the working day (Keynes). It is argued here that 
further increases in the complexity and knowledge-intensity of work under capitalism are 
likely, although not inevitable. Some implications of growing complexity, for work and the 
employment contract, are considered. Raising the question of possible asymmetries between 
labor and capital, their role in generating future increases in inequality is addressed. On the 
other hand, growing complexity may lead to radical changes in the employment contract and 
its evolution into a form of quasi-self-employment. But in an increasingly knowledge-
intensive system, those with inadequate training or skills may be left behind. Compensatory 
policy measures such as a guaranteed basic income and wealth redistribution remain on the 
agenda.  
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The Future of Work in the Twenty-First Century 




The Bible tells us that work was God’s curse upon Adam. In any case, humans must expend 
mental and physical effort to survive. Work has inhabited many institutional forms, including 
slavery, wage-labor and self-employment. Wage-labor was widespread in England from the 
fourteenth century. The nature of the employment relationship has changed dramatically, from 
semi-feudal penury in the early Industrial Revolution (Steinfeld 2001) to contemporary 
arrangements providing significant flexibility and autonomy in some professions.  
This essay considers the future of work in the twenty-first century. Although some 
empirical evidence is cited, its approach is more conceptual and analytic. It considers multiple 
(sometimes conflicting) underlying forces and extant possibilities, rather than firm predictions 
of outcomes. In particular, it includes critical reflections on Karl Marx’s claim that work 
under capitalism would progressively and necessarily be de-skilled, and John Maynard 
Keynes’s prediction that the working day would be dramatically shortened within a couple of 
generations.  
Instead it is argued that capitalism has capacity to create greater complexity and 
knowledge-intensity in production, which has major implications for the nature of work. 
Furthermore, increasing knowledge-intensity places a premium on skilled work, involving 
educated judgement. Consequently, unless remedial policies are in place, the growth of a less-
educated and relatively impoverished underclass is possible, further exacerbating the inherent 
tendency of capitalism to create greater inequality of income and wealth. On the other hand, 
the nature and development of educated labor is likely to require considerable flexibility, 
further weakening authority and control within the employment relationship. This also opens 
up possibilities for more worker cooperatives and self-employed workers.  
This paper has five sections. The first section considers the predictions by Marx and 
Keynes noted above. While both predictions are feasible, each argument is based on a faulty 
and one-sided logic. The second section addresses a more likely (but not inevitable) scenario 
involving increasing complexity and knowledge intensity, and explores some of its 
implications for the nature of work. The third section considers the generators of inequality 
under capitalism and how growing knowledge-intensity affects these forces of divergence. 
Some policies to alleviate inequality are briefly discussed. The fourth section considers the 
abolition and possible transformation of the employment relationship and its effects on work. 
                                                 
1 This paper adapts and expands on some material from Hodgson (2015). The author is very grateful to 
Christopher Brown and anonymous referees for their helpful comments.  
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Although abolition of the employment relationship has questionably been regarded by some 
as a priority, growing knowledge intensity in capitalism is leading to its slow but radical 
transformation. Section five concludes the essay.  
1. Deskilling or the end of work? 
Marx argued that capitalism would lead inevitably to the deskilling of the workforce. Marx 
(1976: 549, 788) proposed that any specialized skill held by a worker ‘vanishes as an 
infinitesimal quantity in the face of the science, the gigantic natural forces, and the mass of 
social labour embodied in the system of machinery.’ Accordingly, the development of 
capitalism ‘enables the capitalist ... to set in motion more labour ... as he progressively 
replaces skilled workers by less skilled.’ This deskilling thesis was later and famously 
elaborated by Harry Braverman (1974).  
The inevitably-of-deskilling hypothesis is confounded by both evidence and argument. As 
Alfred Marshall (1920: 263) pointed out, machines first replace the most monotonous and 
muscular labor. Other forms of work, involving adaptive skills and judgment, are less-readily 
replaceable by machines. There are greater and cheaper possibilities for creating machines to 
do simple and repetitive work, compared with getting machines to carry out sophisticated, 
analytical and creative tasks. Because capitalism is a restless and turbulent system, there are 
limits to what can be foreseen, codified and routinized. Ongoing requirements of adaptability 
and oversight, in an ever-changing and uncertain world, provide opportunities for skilled 
human judgment and intervention.  
The prediction of widespread deskilling has failed to materialize. Historical evidence shows 
that machines can enhance skills rather than reduce them.2 At least throughout the twentieth 
century, in many major sectors of modern capitalist economies, skill levels have increased 
rather than decreased. Citing further evidence against general deskilling, Frederic L. Pryor 
(1996: 55) concluded: 
Although deskilling in terms of substantive skills has occurred in certain industries, the 
notion of a general deskilling process for the economy as a whole represents a triumph of 
ideology over common sense. The fears about a fall in levels of substantive skills arising 
from the shift into services also are groundless. On the contrary, the evidence shows 
clearly that the entire job structure is shifting toward work requiring more data analysis, 
more general education, and also more specific vocational preparation.  
Empirical evidence over the lifetime of capitalism confirms the strong overall trends toward 
higher complexity and increasing levels of skill. While there are examples of deskilling in 
some spheres, the dynamic core of capitalism has become ever-more complex and knowledge 
intensive. General deskilling is possible in principle, but neither realized nor inevitable.  
But this does not mean that extensive deskilling is ruled out. Simon Head (2005, 2014) 
provided plentiful evidence of the use of information technology to simplify the work of 
middle and lower level employees, with digital monitoring to make sure that management 
rules are obeyed. He examined the increasing use of computer business systems (CBSs) that 
involve computer networks and vast quantities of information to monitor employees through 
                                                 
2 Attewell (1992), Wood (1982, 1989), Rubery and Wilkinson (1994), Ashton and Green (1996), Goldin and 
Katz (1996).  
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performance indicators and measures of task fulfilment. This substantive evidence is sobering. 
But some caveats are in order. 
 First, software monitory and information systems are very costly to set up. While 
eventually they may quickly reap pecuniary rewards for the company, they are generally 
tailored to one type of pattern of work. If structures or tasks change radically, then further 
large fixed costs may be incurred. To allow for such flexibility, trained human judgement 
would still be required.  
Second, if work can be broken down by Taylorist ‘scientific managers’ into discrete tasks, 
which are then performance managed using information technology, then those jobs go up the 
queue for automation. For example, some attention has been given to the way Amazon 
warehouse employees are monitored and pressured under a system of hi-tech Taylorism. 
Having broken these jobs into simple tasks, Amazon is exploring their possible automation. In 
2012, Amazon bought a company called Kiva that makes robotic sorting systems for 
warehouses. Head’s scenario for ‘mindless’ work may lead to a ‘jobless’ exit for the 
routinized employee. 
Third, Head produces a large amount of micro evidence, but no general, macro picture of 
overall trends. The extent of the digital Taylorism of work is subject to multiple forces. Other 
things being equal, a higher frequency of radical system change will require a greater number 
of managers and other employees with sophisticated judgmental skills. Other things being 
equal, the march of Taylorized work systems creates the greater possibility of automation and 
opportunities for the reduction of Taylorized human work. Those displaced could end up 
unemployed, or move to more complex jobs still requiring sophisticated human judgement. It 
is a complex and dynamic process, which is difficult to predict. 
Head (2014: 191) himself sees ways out of generalized digital deskilling. These involve 
greater education and training for more highly-skilled jobs, where CBS technologies 
supplement rather than displace these skills: “There are case histories in the United States and 
in Europe where alternative, employee-friendly cultures have taken root.” 
It all depends on which forces and opportunities win out. Scenarios are possible where the 
rising skill levels that marked the twentieth century are arrested and reversed (Hodgson 1999). 
Arguably these scenarios would be associated with less innovative and dynamic economies. 
Is deskilling more prevalent in less-developed economies? Does globalized capitalism 
mean the raising of skill levels in the core, while reducing them elsewhere? Such an 
eventuality is possible in principle, and there is some evidence that exports from richer to 
poorer nations can have deskilling effects in the less-developed economies (Auer 2010). Head 
(2014) gives examples of the Taylorist deskilling of factory work in China where workers 
have limited rights or powers to resist. On the other hand, economies such as China and India, 
which have taken much manufacturing and exporting activity away from Europe and North 
America, show scant evidence of general deskilling. Overall, levels of education and training 
are markedly increasing in these rapidly-growing countries (OECD 2012). 
Now let us consider past predictions of a dramatic shortening of the average working day. 
In a 1930 lecture, Keynes (1931: 325) imagined ongoing exponential economic growth and 
remarked: ‘Think of this in terms of material things – houses, transport, and the like.’ After 
having ‘solved’ the ‘economic problem’ of providing for human material needs, Keynes 
predicted that his hypothetical grandchildren might have to work only fifteen hours a week. 
More than half a century later, contemplating growing automation, André Gorz (1985) and 
Jeremy Rifkin (1995) predicted ‘the end of work.’  
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It is true that average numbers of working hours have decreased in developed countries, but 
to nowhere near the levels envisaged by Keynes and others. Working time previously spent 
with tools and machinery is now spent on computers and ‘smart machines’ (Zuboff 1988). 
Production has become increasingly complex and information-intensive, rather than always 
involving the processing of materials and things. If past futurologists had understood the 
production of wealth as an information-processing, cognitive, and judgmental – as well as a 
physical – process, then they would have been less disposed to forecast dramatic reductions in 
working hours. The increased variety of produced goods and services, and the growing 
complexity of economic systems, mean that these knowledge-based, judgmental tasks and 
possibilities have increased enormously.  
Work is changing more dramatically in character than quantity, with waves of innovation in 
information technology with huge impacts on patterns of employment (Brynjolfsson and 
McAfee 2012). This presents a massive challenge for economic policy-makers. It also 
undermines conventional measures of economic activity and output. The conventional 
methods of measuring and accounting for economic output are deficient not simply because 
they underestimate the natural environment and omit other forms of important activity, such 
as unpaid caring work in families and communities. They are also inadequate in their 
appreciation of the central and growing roles of complex information and knowledge.  
2. Capitalism and growing complexity 
Capitalism is an evolving system with variations between individuals, organizations and 
nation states, where some endure or are copied more than others (Veblen 1899, Hodgson and 
Knudsen 2010). There has been a long theoretical debate whether such evolutionary processes 
necessarily increase systemic complexity (Gould 1977, Saunders and Ho 1976, 1981). 
Disagreement also surrounds what definitions and measures of complexity to use when such 
claims are assessed (Adami et al. 2000). Consistent with mathematical information theory, 
Christoph Adami (2002) upholds that the essence of complexity for an evolving entity is the 
amount of information that it stores about the environment in which it evolves. Complexity is 
thus measured as negentropy. It is the difference between the theoretical maximum amount of 
information about an environment and the actual entropy (disorder) present in organizational 
habits and routines. As this difference increases, the social organization exhibits less disorder 
and more complexity and contains more useful information about the environment. By 
contrast, if there is a diminishing difference between the maximum amount of information 
and actual entropy, then organizations lose track of the environment and exhibit less physical 
complexity.  
Some evolutionary processes in biology can be rapid, such as mutations in viruses. But if 
we were to time-travel back 10,000 years we would be familiar with most of the plants and 
animal species that we found on Earth, despite significant changes of climate and species 
distribution. By contrast, technology would be rudimentary compared to today, and human 
institutions would be relatively primitive. Especially since 1750, social and economic change 
has been dramatic. Institutions and technology have become much more sophisticated. 
Complexity has grown rapidly in the socio-economic sphere. Capitalism is by far the most 
dynamic and complex economic system so far in human history. 
What are the drivers of rapidly increasing complexity within capitalism? One major factor 
is the expansion and diversification of markets. As Adam Smith proposed, the growth of 
markets can enable an ever-finer division of labor, which in turn can fuel greater productivity, 
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reduce costs and enable a further enlargement of markets. Allyn Young (1928:. 537) argued in 
a classic article that ‘industrial differentiation … remains the type of change characteristically 
associated with the growth of production.’ He also underlined ‘the increase in the complexity 
of the apparatus of living, as shown by the increase in the variety of goods offered in 
consumers’ markets’ plus an allegedly greater ‘diversification of intermediate products.’ 
Capitalist corporations seek ever-new opportunities for trade and gain. As competition 
intensifies within particular markets, profit-seeking corporations innovate and diversify their 
products, in the unceasing pursuit of new market niches (Chamberlin 1933, Abernathy and 
Clark 1985, Rueschemeyer 1986, Metcalfe 1998). Firms in competition continuously face the 
choice of sticking with the same products and trying to drive down costs, or to innovate and 
find new product niches. Many firms invest in new technology or new skills. In this quest for 
innovation, the frontiers of science and technology are advanced, leading to new fields of 
knowledge and enquiry. New products are created and marketed. Improved global 
communications and increased mobility give a further impetus to product diversification and 
greater complexity. New and varied organizational forms are devised to increase productivity 
and to manage an exponentially expanding number of products and processes. Accordingly, 
there is a long-run tendency in dynamic capitalist economic systems towards greater 
complexity, driven by powerful economic forces, both caused by and causing the widening of 
markets, and leading to innovation and greater product diversification (Warsh 1985, Pryor 
1996).  
Complexity and variety grew in preceding socio-economic systems, particularly when there 
was expanding trade and growing markets. What additional conditions promoted the 
spectacular rise of productivity in capitalism after 1800? Joseph Schumpeter (1934) and 
others were right to underline the role of the financial sector and its capacity to bankroll 
corporate innovation and expansion. In the leading capitalist countries these necessary 
conditions set off a process of positive feedback, where corporate innovation fed markets and 
markets fed innovation. Economies grew remarkably in both scale and complexity.  
Capitalism has created a cornucopia of different outputs. Eric Beinhocker (2006: 9, 456-
457) estimated that there may be about ten billion distinct goods for sale in New York City. 
There were far fewer in the year 1800. By investigating the diversity and pattern of exported 
products, César A. Hidalgo and Ricardo Hausmann (2009) measured the complexity levels of 
several national economies. They showed that these measures of complexity are correlated 
with a country’s level of income, further indicating that capitalist economic development is 
strongly associated with both a growth of knowledge and a growth of complexity (Hausmann 
et al. 2011).  
Although a growth in complexity and a rise in average levels of skill are not the same thing, 
but they have been, and are likely to continue to be, causally interlinked and correlated. 
Continuous innovation requires retraining and adaptability. We can consider an alternative 
scenario where computers displace human ingenuity and the remaining work of humans 
would become routine and inflexible (Hodgson 1999: 186-9, 235-70). But computer 
algorithms cannot replace all human intuition and tacit judgment (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986). 
At least for the foreseeable future, growing complexity is more likely to depend upon rising 
levels of human skill, especially skills involving information technology (Zuboff 1988, Levy 
and Murnane 1996).  
But the growth of complexity in capitalism is not preordained. Capitalism has existed for a 
few hundred years. We cannot generalize from such a short period. We can conceive of long 
periods of crisis or stagnation, with slower rates of innovation. Nuclear conflict, pandemics, 
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ecological catastrophes, or natural disasters may drag capitalism back to a lower level of 
development. With increasing dependence on electronic information networks, and greater 
vulnerability to cyber-attacks and system crashes, the integration and complexity of global 
capitalism has itself become a problem that could endanger its survival.  
To some degree, the growing knowledge intensity of capitalism threatens the logic of a 
system based on well-defined property rights. The peculiarities of information as an asset 
were noted by Richard Nelson (1959) and Kenneth Arrow (1962). In addition, attempts to 
establish widespread private ownership of information, thus making vital non-rivalrous 
resources excludable, can have inegalitarian and dysfunctional consequences. The growing 
knowledge-intensity of capitalism challenges the universal claims of private property. 
Attempts to over-extend rights of ownership of information can challenge the vitality of 
capitalism at its core (Heller 2008). We could end up with an ‘intellectual monopoly 
capitalism’ that, through monopolized property rights in information that in principle could be 
usefully and cheaply dispersed, is highly sub-optimal in performance terms (Pagano 2014).  
This would be especially the case in a knowledge-intensive economy where the 
accumulation of capital (i.e. collateralizable property) required much knowledge to be 
privatized. This denial of shared possession of non-rival assets would constrain the growth of 
knowledge-intensive capitalism. This could lead to political challenges to the system. 
It is also clear that the past dynamism of capitalism has depended on a delicate institutional 
arrangement of political, legal, cultural and other conditions. These institutions can unravel. 
The massive growth of variety and complexity in capitalism, exhibited especially in the 
second half of the twentieth century, may not be as rapid in the twenty-first. But prediction, 
especially with complex systems, is highly fallible.  
3. Work, exploitation and inequality 
An implication of growing knowledge intensity under capitalism is that a greater premium is 
based on education, knowledge and knowledge-intensive skills. Consequently, unless there 
are successful efforts to provided adequate advanced education and training for everyone, 
then there is the possibility of a growing divide – involving different levels of income and 
social inclusion – between those with and without such skills. Without broad and inclusive 
educational provision, we face the possibility of a growing underclass consigned to menial 
jobs and lower pay.   
Potential inequality due to growing knowledge intensity adds to other mechanisms of 
inequality under capitalism. Marx assumed a labor theory value: having presumed that labor 
was the source of all value, he then declared that those that lived off property were exploiting 
those that worked. But this assumes what it has to prove. Instead we must look at asymmetries 
between labor and capital ownership that stem from their nature, rather than from an arbitrary 
and biased assumption. Detecting one such asymmetry, the political philosopher Thomas 
Green (1888: 373) wrote:  
Labour, the economist tells us, is a commodity exchangeable like other commodities. This 
is in a certain sense true, but it is a commodity which attaches in a peculiar manner to the 
person of man. Hence restrictions may need to be placed on the sale of this commodity 
which would be unnecessary in other cases, in order to prevent labour from being sold 
under conditions which make it impossible for the person selling it ever to become a free 
contributor to social good in any form. 
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The economist Alfred Marshall (1920: 566) echoed this idea: ‘when a person sells his 
services, he has to present himself where they are delivered. It matters nothing to the seller of 
bricks whether they are to be used in building a palace or a sewer: but it matters a great deal 
to the seller of labour.’ John A. Hobson (1929: 209) wrote similarly that a ‘disabling element 
in the sale of labour-power is that it is not detachable in the conditions of its delivery from the 
human factors of personality.’ Compared with the capitalist who makes his property available 
and may reap a reward without actually being present on the job, the worker and her labor-
power are inseparable (Dow 2003). I have called this corporeal exploitation (Hodgson 1982).  
Corporeal exploitation is present in any mode of production involving labor and other 
owned factors of production. The problem is the disadvantage that inseparability bestows 
upon labor, compared with the owners of other factors. Given that capitalists can delegate the 
tasks of management to others, and obtain rewards simply from their ownership of non-labor 
assets, they are placed at an advantage. They can use their time for trading and other 
entrepreneurial ventures, while simultaneously their property reaps rewards. Hence corporeal 
exploitation is likely to have cumulative effects, creating a widening division between one 
social class and another. Workers have less time to devote to their education or training, or to 
search for alternative opportunities.  
The differences between factors of production in this regard can be ended, by eradicating 
the capacity to reap a reward from the private ownership of non-labor assets. This might 
happen through wholesale nationalization, or by creating an economy with self-employed 
producers or worker cooperatives. None of these solutions overcomes the inseparability of 
laboring activity from the worker: at best they deal with labor’s disadvantage by abolishing 
incomes from the separate ownership of other factors of production.  
Alleviation of the problem of corporeal exploitation can result from the reduction of the 
working day, which would give workers more time apart from their work. But the 
fundamental difference – noted by Green, Marshall and Hobson – between the inseparability 
of labor from its agency, and the separability of other assets from their proprietors, will 
always remain within capitalism.  
Corporeal exploitation is different from bargaining exploitation, which results from 
asymmetries of bargaining power between agents in the sphere of exchange.3 But although 
employers often have much greater bargaining power, combinations of workers can 
sometimes exert strong bargaining power over employers. Bargaining exploitation typically 
exists under capitalism, but strictly it is not necessary for its existence. In principle it is 
conceivable that capitalism could exist with relatively little bargaining asymmetry, 
particularly if employees were organized in very strong unions.4 
By contrast, the collateralization of property is central to the functioning of capitalism 
(Hodgson 2015). In the real world, beyond the distortions of economics and sociology, capital 
                                                 
3 In Hodgson (1982) I noted Chamberlain’s (1951) measure of bargaining power: bargaining power of A = (cost 
to B of disagreement with A)/(cost to B of agreement with A). In Marshall’s (1920, pp. 565-9) discussion of the 
“peculiarities” of labor, as opposed to other agents of production, he (p. 569) saw these peculiarities as a source 
of labor’s “disadvantage in bargaining” which “wherever it exists is likely to be cumulative in its effects.”  
4 Some economists identified a source of asymmetrical bargaining power in the “perishability” of labor power 
(Marshall 1920, p. 567; Hobson 1929, pp. 208-9). If unemployed this hour, then that labor is lost forever. Here, 
“perishability” relates to opportunities for use. Hence, as Marshall (1920, p. 567) concedes and Hutt (1930) 
emphasizes, land and machines are also perishable in this sense. A machine unused is also an opportunity lost 
forever. Labor power is not unique in this respect.  
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means property that can be used as collateral for securing monetary loans (Hodgson 2014, 
2015). Differential collateralizability leads us to another dimension of exploitation and a 
powerful engine of cumulative inequality. Employees are not slaves and selling oneself into 
slavery is prohibited. Hence capitalism limits the possibility of mortgaging labor power. 
Banks may lend money on the basis of expected future earnings. But if the loan is not repaid, 
they cannot seize the earner and sell her as a slave. Freedom from enslavement denies the 
employee opportunities for obtaining loans using labor assets as collateral. This is exploitation 
through unequal collateralizability.5  
Unequal access to collateral is a major source of further inequality. Unless they have other 
property, workers cannot obtain sizeable loans. By contrast, the capitalist receives incomes 
from property, which can also be used as collateral to borrow more money and invest still 
more in profitable enterprises. Capitalism thus follows the Biblical maxim: ‘for whosoever 
hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from 
him shall be taken away even that he hath.’6 
The foremost generator of inequality under capitalism is capital.7 This may sound Marxist, 
but it is not. Elsewhere (Hodgson 2014, 2015) I defined capital differently from Marx and 
most other economists (excepting Fetter, Hobson, Mitchell Innes, Schumpeter, Sombart and 
Weber). Capital is money, or the realizable money-value of owned and collateralizable 
property. Precisely because waged employees are not slaves, they cannot use their lifetime 
capacity for work as collateral to obtain money loans. The very commercial freedom of a 
worker denies her the possibility to use her labor assets or skills as collateral. By contrast, the 
capitalist may use his property to make profits, and as collateral to borrow money, invest and 
make still more money. Differences become cumulative, between those with and without 
collateralizable assets, and between different amounts of collateralizable wealth. Even when 
workers become home-owners with mortgages, the wealthier can still race ahead.  
Labor cannot be collateralized because workers are not owned. They do not contract their 
entire future working lives to an employer: there are missing futures markets for labor. A 
further and very important consequence is that employers have diminished incentives to 
invest in the skills of their workforce. As Marshall (1920: 565) put it: ‘Here again we meet the 
difficulty that whoever may incur the expense of investing capital in developing the abilities 
of the workman, these abilities will be the property of the workman himself: and thus the 
virtue of those who have aided him must remain for the greater part its own reward.’ 
Especially as capitalism becomes more knowledge-intensive, and unless compensatory 
measures are put in place, an unskilled and low-paid underclass can emerge through 
insufficient employer incentives to train their workers. This would further exacerbate 
inequality. Suitable compensatory measures include a state subsidy for training at work 
(Holzer et al. 1993, Van Horn and Fichtner 2003, Thelen 2004).  
Another source of inequality results from the inseparability of the worker from the work 
itself. By contrast, the owners of other factors or production are free to trade and seek other 
                                                 
5 This does not mean that slaves are free of exploitation. They suffer the loss of legal rights and are exploited in 
different ways. The forms of exploitation discussed here are the ones most relevant for capitalism.  
6 Matthew ch. 13, v. 12. See also Mark, ch. 4, v. 25, Luke ch. 8, v. 18 and Luke ch. 19, v. 26.  
7 Piketty (2014) provided historical data and rich empirical vindication of this claim. He showed that the main 
driver of inequality is the tendency of returns on capital to exceed the rate of economic growth.   
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opportunities while their property makes money or yields other rewards. As Green, Marshall 
and Hobson recognized, this puts workers at a disadvantage. As noted above, even slight 
disadvantages can have cumulative effects.  
None of these core drivers of inequality can be diminished by extending markets or 
increasing competition. These drivers are congenital to capitalism and its system of wage 
labor. If capitalism is to be retained, then the compensatory arrangements required to counter 
inequality cannot simply be extensions of markets or private property rights. Instead, other 
measures such as wealth redistribution are placed on the agenda (Paine 1797, Ackerman and 
Alstott 1999, Bowles and Gintis 1999, Piketty 2014). 
As noted above, in modern capitalism those deprived of such education suffer a degree of 
social exclusion, and this problem, unless addressed, is likely to get worse (Cowen 2013). 
Widespread skill-development policies are needed, alongside integrated measures to deal with 
job displacement and unemployment (Ashton and Green 1996, Crouch et al. 1999, Acemoglu 
and Autor 2011, 2012).  
The need for ongoing education is an additional argument for a basic income guarantee. 
Such a basic income would be paid to everyone out of state funds, irrespective of other 
income or wealth, and whether working or not (Van Parijs 1992, 1995, Corning 2011). It is 
justified on the grounds that individuals require a minimum income to function as free and 
choosing agents. Everyone has the right to the means of survival, so that they can make use of 
their liberty, have some autonomy, function as effective citizens, and participate in civil 
society. These are conditions of adequate and educated inclusion in the market world of 
choice and trade.  
A basic income would also reward caring work to help the sick or elderly, which is 
typically performed within families. But it is typically undervalued and uncompensated 
monetarily (Folbre 1995, Folbre and Nelson 2000, Nussbaum 2000, Jochimsen 2003). A basic 
income would also encourage new entrepreneurs and creative artists, and reduce migration 
from the countryside to the cities in search of work. There would also be a huge saving in 
administration costs of often complex social security and welfare schemes.  
4. Beyond employment? 
Marx upheld that the employment relationship is a central defining feature of capitalism. In an 
employment contract the worker agrees, within limits, to work under the authority of an 
employer. There is potential employer control over the manner and pattern of work. This 
control typically concerns the manner and specification of the work to be performed. Marx 
argued in Capital that the power of ‘capital’ is exercised precisely at this point, within the 
sphere of production, where ‘surplus value’ is allegedly generated. Hence, for Marxists, the 
abolition of the employment relationship is one of their foremost political objectives 
(Screpanti 2001, Wolff 2012).  
Also from a non-Marxist viewpoint, David Ellerman (1992) criticized the employment 
relationship: he saw it as partial slavery. The slave owner has control rights over the slave. An 
employee rents her capacities for a limited period of time, and grants control rights for that 
period to an employer. Ellerman argued that just as slavery is immoral and illegal, 
employment likewise should be condemned and prohibited. Voluntary agreement to an 
employment contract is not a valid counter-argument. There are prohibitions in most countries 
on many consensual activities: individuals are not allowed to sell banned drugs, their votes, or 
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themselves into slavery. According to Ellerman, entering into an employment contract, 
thereby conceding authority to an employer means an abdication of individual rights and 
responsibilities and it should be outlawed. His alternative is a system of worker cooperatives, 
where decisions are taken jointly and democratically by the workforce, and no-one is strictly 
an employee. Following Jaroslav Vanek (1970, 1972) and others, Ellerman proposed the 
abolition of all capitalist firms, and their replacement by autonomous worker cooperatives, 
each able to enter into contracts and trade on markets.  
Possible advantages of such a system of worker cooperatives are discussed below. But is 
the abolition of employment a priority? An opposing case is less absolutist and more lenient. 
This would permit wider experimentation with different forms, including modified capitalist 
firms and corporations.  
But Ellerman and others would protest: for them this is a matter of principle. There can be 
no compromise with this modern version of servitude: people should be neither rented nor 
sold. But the real world is more complex. Just as in practice the line is often difficult to draw 
between an employment contract and a contract for services, authority and responsibility each 
come in fifty shades of grey.  
In some practical cases the exercise of authority by employers is extremely limited. For 
example, with knowledge-intensive employment, close detailed supervision is often 
dysfunctional or impossible. Often the knowledge worker has more specialist knowledge than 
her line manager. But it is also the case with other professions. An employed truck driver is 
told what load to pick up, and when and where it should be delivered. Otherwise there is little 
close supervision of the activity. The pattern and nature of the work would not be changed 
hugely if the driver owned the truck and was self-employed. Self-employment has 
advantages, but also the disadvantages that the driver has greater responsibility for the upkeep 
of the truck and increased financial anxieties. The choice is not black versus white.  
Authority of a kind exists in worker cooperatives. The inevitable division of labor leads to 
different roles and identities. Within groups, leaders typically emerge. Although individuals in 
the group may nominally have equal rights and votes, studies of group dynamics show 
internal group differentiation, subgroup formation, differential influence, and the emergence 
of hierarchies of power (Hogg and Terry 2000, Keltner et al. 2008). While workers in a 
cooperative cannot be threatened with dismissal in the same way as employees, other threats 
and sanctions operate within groups.  
A worker shareholder in a cooperative has ties and responsibilities that may not suit 
everyone. Majority rule in a democratic collective can compromise the needs or rights of 
minorities. For example, pressure may be put on all workers to put in the same hours, thus 
side-lining part-time or flexible work patterns. The difficulty of shareholder exit is a serious 
problem in worker cooperatives. Workers may not be able to sell or obtain the full value of 
their share. The employment relationship is typically easier and less costly to terminate. Many 
people are willing to accede to some authority in the workplace in return for greater flexibility 
in dealing with the rest of their lives.  
Finally, submission to political authority in any large society is unavoidable. Modern states 
involve monopolies of legitimate force and complex legal systems to which, even in a 
democracy, no-one has consented in detail. The abolition of all authority is the pipe-dream of 
anarchism. The practical focus instead should be on checks, balances, legal limitations, and 
democratically accountable oversight.   
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Consequently, the emphasis should be on improving the rules and conditions governing the 
employment relationship rather than abolishing it entirely. This would involve both general 
legislation and employee negotiation with particular employers. The general policy approach 
towards the organization of enterprise should be experimental, trying different types of firms, 
including cooperatives and other structures. Find what works best, in regard to individual 
satisfaction and human flourishing, as well as profitability or revenue. Then experiment anew.  
Consider the implications of specialization and growing knowledge-intensity in a capitalist 
economy, with possible scenarios rather than predictions. It is an exercise in ‘what if?’ Other 
outcomes are possible, including mass automation and consumption without human cultural 
enrichment, or an economy where information technology results in increased surveillance 
rather than the development of skills (Head 2005, 2014; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012).  
One possible path of capitalist development may undermine the employment relationship 
within capitalism. The scenario explored here concerns the most knowledge-intensive core of 
the world capitalist system, rather than every sector or recess. This does not rule out the 
persistence of a substantial underclass of unskilled or unemployed workers, in both developed 
and developing countries.  
Employment involves potential control and supervision by others. But as Peter Drucker 
(1993: 107) pointed out, the knowledge-intensive organization ‘is increasingly composed of 
specialists, each of whom knows more about his or her own specialty than anybody else in the 
organization.’ If the worker has highly specific and idiosyncratic skills, then proficient 
supervision and control depend also on the possession of relevant capabilities by the 
supervisor. As complexity and specialization increase, these particular capabilities may 
become increasingly scarce. Close and highly evaluative supervision, based on a hierarchy of 
command, would be less viable, simply because the nominal supervisors will not know the 
best way of doing the job, or even its precise purpose. The worker will know better (Cornuelle 
1976, Zuboff 1988). 
In a complex, evolving, knowledge-intensive system, agents require sophisticated cognitive 
abilities. Workers and managers have to learn, adapt and create anew.8 A knowledge-intensive 
economy involves the dematerialization of much production, and the shift from physical to 
intellective skills. As Shoshana Zuboff (1988: 71) put it in her classic study: ‘Immediate 
physical responses must be replaced by an abstract thought process in which options are 
considered, and choices are made and then translated into the terms of the information 
system.’ The growing knowledge-intensity of work means a shift from physical power and 
dexterity to the processing and evaluation of ideas. All human activity involves the use of 
both muscle and brain. But as the balance shifts radically from muscle to intellect and from 
the manipulation of materials to symbols, work undergoes a fundamental transformation. 
Computers can mimic some aspects of intelligent behavior with their immense data-
processing powers. But (at least so far) they cannot replicate key features of human 
intelligence. Crucially, they lack intuition and sophisticated judgment (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
1986), including the capacity for moral judgement. Insofar as computers can take over some 
functions, the overall, net outcome in terms of the balance of skills in the workforce is not 
necessarily towards deskilling. 
                                                 
8 See Marquand (1989), Senge (1990), Drucker (1993), Fransman (1994), Boisot (1995), Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995), Choo (1998).  
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Computers may free up skilled workers for tasks of a more evaluative and judgmental 
character. Critical judgment involves asking questions and saying ‘no’ when things do not 
seem right. But questioning established procedures can be inimical to managerial authority. 
As Zuboff (1988: 291, 308) elaborated: 
Obedience has been the axial principle of task execution in the traditional environment of 
imperative control. … When tasks require intellective effort, however, obedience can be 
dysfunctional and can impede the exploitation of information. Under such conditions, 
internal commitment and motivation replace authority as the primary bond between the 
individual and the task. … The explication of meaning that is so central to the 
development of intellective skills requires that people become their own authorities. ... 
Without the consensual immediacy of a shared action context, individuals must construct 
interpretations of the information at hand and so reveal what they believe to be 
significant. In this way, authority is located in the process of creating and articulating 
meaning, rather than in a particular position or function.  
The shift from physical to intellectual work can undermine supervisory powers. With physical 
work, managers can observe the activity and its output, and make judgments concerning the 
efficiency and aptitude of the worker. But with intellective skills, meaningful supervision is 
less viable. It is impossible to see what is going on in someone’s head. 
Consequently, as the complexity and knowledge-intensity of production processes increase, 
the key characteristic in the employment contract of detailed managerial control is 
increasingly bounded and impaired.  
On the other hand, developments in information technology increase possibilities for 
workforce surveillance (Head 2005, 2014). But such oversight would mainly concern the 
detectable aspects of work, and less the quality of judgment and the workings of the mind. If 
managers cannot know some of what their workers know, then neither I suggest can 
technology. Furthermore, the installation of surveillance systems can also undermine the 
culture of trust and co-operation which is necessary for the full development of the 
knowledge-intensive economy.  
Well before the end of the twentieth century the possibilities for detailed monitoring were 
limited. As Nelson (1981: 1038) pointed out: ‘management cannot effectively ‘choose’ what 
is to be done in any detailed way, and has only broad control over what is done, and how well. 
Only a small portion of what people actually do on a job can be monitored in detail.’ As 
complexity, specialization and knowledge-intensity increase, detailed managerial direction 
will become less viable and productive. Workers have always possessed some tacit and other 
skills beyond the reach of managerial comprehension. But in modern, complex, knowledge-
intensive capitalism the predicament has become immensely more compounded and severe. 
What were formerly regarded as exclusively managerial, administrative or organizational 
capabilities are increasingly being expected of other workers. The old distinctions between the 
conception of a task and its execution, as elaborated in the ‘scientific management’ of 
Frederick Winslow Taylor (1911), have long been eroded (Vroom and Deci 1970). 
A further consequence of an increasing reliance on advanced skills and knowledge, would 
be that these become relatively more important, compared with the physical instruments of 
work, such as tools and machines. This shifting balance would be expressed in changes in 
relative costs. Insofar as the physical means of production become relatively less important, 
the question of who owns them becomes less consequential to a similar degree. Accordingly, 
the possession of useful knowledge and skills by the worker increases in relative significance, 
compared to the tangible instruments of work. It is not being suggested that we should 
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disregard the question of who owns the means of production. What is being argued is that the 
changing balance between intangible and tangible assets and the growing reliance on 
knowledge and skills mean that the relative bargaining power of the skilled employee 
increases, and the gap in this respect between the skilled and the unskilled worker widens. 
These differences lead to growing differences of income, and possible shortages of skilled 
labor, compared with possible mass unemployment of unskilled labor.  
As more workers would be in possession of valuable set of conceptual, analytical, 
administrate and other skills, then the notion of ‘proletarians’ – meaning literally that they 
possess nothing but their children – become even more of an exaggeration. But this does not 
mean the abolition of divisions between social classes, or necessarily a reduction in material 
inequality.  
These developments create increasing practical problems for the legal distinction between 
employment contracts and contracts for services. The legal system has already experienced 
severe difficulties in identifying whether or not a worker is under the detailed supervisory 
control of another person. Hence, as noted above, the provision or otherwise of the physical 
instruments of work is often used as a surrogate criterion. But knowledge is intangible, so this 
legal test faces severe difficulties. Self-employed experts and consultants are widely used in 
modern capitalism, yet their provision of physical instruments of work is minimal.  
As the boundary between manager and employee breaks down, a kind of quasi-self-
employment may develop. By owning part of the intangible means of production, in the form 
of specialist knowledge, and having a considerable degree of control over her work process, 
in some respects the employee will resemble a self-employed worker. On the other hand, the 
employing corporation will retain ownership of the goods or services that are produced, of the 
physical means of production, and some of the crucial mechanisms of knowledge 
accreditation. For these reasons the worker does not become fully self-employed, in either a 
de facto or a de jure sense. Nevertheless, the possession of highly specialist knowledge, and 
the control of the work process by the employee, can give the worker some practical 
autonomy. We can find examples of this quasi-self-employment today, in many public and 
private universities, and in some research units in large, knowledge-intensive capitalist 
corporations. 
As Charles Handy (1984) pointed out, with the increase in the relative and absolute cost of 
specialist skills, there may be more cases of employment contracts being replaced by de facto 
and de jure self-employment, where the skilled worker contracts explicitly for specific 
services, not hours of work. The relatively high cost of skilled labor provides a strong push 
towards the hiring of the services of skilled, professional individuals or groups, on the basis of 
a contract for services rather than an employment contract.  
With the increasing role of specialist and idiosyncratic knowledge, and the emergence of 
real- and quasi-self-employment, the stipulation of a number of hours to be worked would 
lose much of its operational significance and meaning. Even if she remains formally an 
employee, the knowledge worker may require periods of contemplation, reading, research or 
study that cannot always be confined to official office hours. By its nature, knowledge work 
means a shift from time-keeping to normative control, permitting indefinite extension and 
intensification. Work will be taken home, to be performed in an unsupervised environment. 
The boundary between work and leisure becomes blurred. These developments bring severe 
dangers, such as overwork and a deprived family life, as well as benefits such as self-
supervision and autonomy.  
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With all these developments, the meaning of the employment contract would be stretched 
to the limit, creating normative and legal tensions that may suggest its radical reformulation. 
This bodes the end of the classical employment relationship, the transformation of the 
capitalist firm, and definitionally the demise of capitalism itself. 
These developments are detectable are some areas of work, even in profit-hungry capitalist 
corporations. It remains to be seen whether this scenario will become more widespread, or 
whether different futures shall unfold. While employment contracts have a long history going 
back to medieval times, the nature of the employment contract has changed radically over the 
centuries, from quasi-feudal servitude, through centuries where employees faced the sanctions 
of criminal law, to the degree of autonomy and self-motivation found in some areas of 
modern employment today. Further fundamental changes cannot be ruled out.  
5. Conclusion 
We cannot predict the future. At best we can identify some trends. One of these is growing 
complexity and knowledge intensity in capitalism, and these have major implications for the 
employment contract and the nature of work. At the same time, inequality is on a strong 
upward trend in several major countries (Piketty 2014). All of these developments involve 
major challenges.  
Capitalism is a restless system and it will continue to develop. One possible scenario is 
where the employment contract (at least in the most knowledge-intensive sectors) moves 
toward a form of quasi-self-employment. Work and employment have changed dramatically 
since the 1700s and there is no reason to assume that their development will come to an end. 
Employment contracts may also be pushed aside by growing worker cooperatives or self-
employment. If – like Marx – our definition of capitalism involves the ubiquity of the 
employment relationship, then these developments could signal the end of capitalism, 
although this scenario is very different from the one envisaged by Marx. 
These developments offer major challenges. The traditional role of trade unions is brought 
into question. While they may retain the vital role of representation of the workforce in 
negotiations with employers over broad issues of common concern, professional and more 
specific issues such as the provision of education, training and legal support in an increasingly 
complex environment become relatively more important.  
At the national and international levels, policymakers have to address matters such as 
growing inequality, and the provision of widespread education and training to minimize the 
less-educated underclass. Policy measures such as a guaranteed basic income and wealth 
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